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Abstract
Quantumkey distribution (QKD) systems often rely on polarization of light for encoding, thus
limiting the amount of information that can be sent per photon and placing tight bounds on the error
rates that such a system can tolerate. Here we describe a proof-of-principle experiment that indicates
the feasibility of high-dimensional QKDbased on the transverse structure of the lightfield allowing
for the transfer ofmore than 1 bit per photon.Our implementation uses the orbital angular
momentum (OAM) of photons and the correspondingmutually unbiased basis of angular position
(ANG).Our experiment uses a digitalmicro-mirror device for the rapid generation of OAMand
ANGmodes at 4 kHz, and amode sorter capable of sorting single photons based on their OAMand
ANGcontent with a separation efficiency of 93%. Through the use of a seven-dimensional alphabet
encoded in theOAMandANGbases, we achieve a channel capacity of 2.05 bits per sifted photon.Our
experiment demonstrates that, in addition to having an increased information capacity,multilevel
QKD systems based on spatial-mode encoding can bemore resilient against intercept-resend
eavesdropping attacks.
1. Introduction
First introduced in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard, quantumkey distribution (QKD) is amethod for distributing
a secret key between two parties [1, 2]. Due to a fundamental property of quantumphysics known as the no-
cloning theorem, any attemptmade by a third party to eavesdrop inevitably leads to errors that can be detected
by the sender and receiver [3, 4].ModernQKD schemes conventionally use a qubit system for encoding
information, such as the polarization of a photon. Such systems are easily implemented because technology for
encoding and decoding information in a qubit state-space is readily available today, enabling system clock rates
in theGHz regime [5–7]. Recently, the spatial degree of freedomof photons has been identified as an extremely
useful resource for transferring information [8, 9]. The information transfer capacity of classical
communication links has been increased tomore than one terabit per second using spatial-modemultiplexing
[10]. In addition, it has been theoretically shown that employingmultilevel quantum states (qudits) can increase
the robustness of aQKD system against eavesdropping [11–14]. Although themajority of high-dimensional
QKD schemes so far have employed time-bin encoding for increasing the alphabet size [15–18], it is expected
that spatial-mode encoding can be alternatively used to enhance the performance of aQKD system considering
the recent advances in free-space orbital angularmomentum (OAM) communication, .
The feasibility of high-dimensional QKD in the spatial domain has been previously demonstrated by
encoding information in the transverse linearmomentum and position bases [19, 20].While such encoding
schemes provide a simple solution for increasing the information capacity, they are not suitable for long-haul
optical links due to the cross-talk caused by diffraction. Diffraction creates a varying transmission loss for
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different spatial frequencies that results inmixing of spatialmodes [21, 22]. Cross-talk increases the quantum
symbol error rate (SER) and fundamentally limits the secure key rate of aQKD system. This adverse effect can be
alleviated by employingOAMmodes. Due to their rotational symmetry, OAMmodes have the desirable
property of remaining orthogonal upon propagation in a systemwith round apertures [23]. In a recent
experiment, OAMmodeswere used for performing classical communication over a 3 km long free-space optical
link [24]. In this experiment, themain contribution of turbulencewas shown to be a transverse displacement of
theOAMmodes i.e., a tip-tilt error that can be readily corrected forwith present technology. As such,OAM
modes are ideal candidates for use in a free-space quantum communication link.
TheOAMof photons has enabledmany applications in the field of quantum information including studies
of quantum entanglement [25–28], photonic superdense coding [29], realization of high-dimensional
wavefunctions [30], and quantum cloning [31]. Similarly, a number of studies have investigated the benefits of
employingOAMmodes in quantum cryptography [32–34]. Recently, rotation-invariantOAMvectormodes
have been used for performingQKD in a two-dimensional state space [35]. Although thismethod offers an
advantage in terms of optical alignment, it fails to utilize the large information capacity of theOAMbasis. The
complete realization of a high-dimensional QKD systemwithOAMhas remained impractical up until now
mostly due to the difficulty in efficiently sorting single photons in theOAMbasis. Additionally, any realistic
application requires a fast key-generation rate that cannot be achievedwithmost of the commonmethods for
generatingOAMmodes.
2.High-dimensional QKDwithOAM
In this paper we describe a proof-of-principle experiment that demonstrates the feasibility of performing high-
dimensional quantum cryptographywithOAMmodes.We encode information in a seven-dimensional set of
OAMmodes alongwithmodes in themutually unbiased basis of azimuthal angle (ANG).Our scheme uses a
digitalmicro-mirror device (DMD) for fast generation, and an efficient technique for unambiguous sorting of
bothOAMandANGmodes. By combining these techniques, we selectively generate the set of 14 spatialmodes
at a rate of 4 kHz and correspondingly detect themwith a separation efficiency of 93%.Wemeasure a channel
capacity of 2.05 bits per sifted photonwith an average SER of 10.5% that is well below the error bounds that are
required for security against intercept-resend eavesdropping attacks. Of our SER, 4% is due to detector dark
counts and ambient light, and 6.5% is due to errors due to intermodal crosstalk.
In our scheme, Alice randomly chooses her photons from two complementary bases. The primary encoding
basis is a set of OAMvortexmodes. Thesemodes have a top-hat intensity structure and a helical phase profile
characterized byΨ =ℓ ℓφeOAM i , whereℓ ∈ −{ 3: 3} (see figure 1).We construct amutually unbiased basis set
using a linear combination of OAMmodes of index ℓ∣ ∣ ⩽ 3with equal amplitudes
∑Ψ Ψ π ℓ=
ℓ
ℓ
=−d
n
d
1
exp
i2
, (1)n
N
N
ANG OAM ⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
where the dimension = + =d N2 1 7 in our experiment.We refer to thesemodes as the angular (ANG)modes
due to their localized intensity patterns (see figure 1). TheANGmodes form amutually unbiased basis with
respect to theOAMbasis [36–38]
Ψ Ψ ℓ= ∀ℓ d n1 { , }. (2)nANG OAM
2
Consequently, themeasurement of a photon in theANGbasis provides no information about itsOAM state and
vice versa. Additionally, the ANG and theOAMbases remainmutually unbiased upon propagation (See
appendix).
Our experimental setup is depicted infigure 1. A collimated beam from ahelium–neon laser illuminates a
binary hologram realized on aDMD to generate spatialmodes [39].We use a prepare-and-measure scheme
similar to the BB84 protocol [1]. Alice initially picks a random sequence of desiredOAMandANGmodes and
loads the binary holograms for generating each of themodes in the sequence to theDMD’s internalmemory. To
transmit each symbol, Alice then triggers theDMDandmodulates the beamusing an acousto-opticmodulator
to create rectangular pulses of 125 nswidth. The beampower is attenuated such that each pulse contains on
average μ = 0.1photons. The prepared states are then imaged to Bob’s receiving aperture via a 4f telescope that
forms a lossless 2 m long communication link.
Bob’smode sorter consists of two refractive elements for performing a log-polar to cartesian transformation
[40]. Going through these elements, anOAMmode is converted to a planewavewith a tilt that is proportional to
theOAMmode indexℓ. A single lens focuses such a planewave into a spot that is shifted by an amount
proportional toℓ. Similarly, anANGmode transforms to a localized spot shifted by an amount proportional to
2
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the angular index n. A beam splitter is used to randomly choose between theOAMandANGbases. In order to
reduce the overlap between the neighboring transformedmodes, we use a coherent beam combination
technique [41]. A fan-out element is realized on a phase-only spatial lightmodulator (SLM) to divide the
incident light intomultiple copies. The copies are phase corrected using a second SLMand are recombined by a
lens to a series ofmuch narrower spotswith the same initial spacing between them. In addition, two cylindrical
lenses are realized on the SLMs to adjust the aspect ratio of the transformedmodes.
The sortedmodes are coupled to an array offibers that are connected to avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Due
to the limited number of available APDs (four), Bob’s data for each group of the the symbols is taken separately
and is combined later. The signal from theAPDs is processed by afield-programmable gate array to produce
photon counts using a gating signal sharedwithAlice. The photon detection events arefinally saved in Bob’s
computer. Alice and Bob are also connected via a classical link realized by an ethernet cable running a TCP/IP
protocol. After Alice and Bob collect a sufficiently large number of symbols, they stop themeasurement. At this
point, they publicly broadcast the bases used for preparation andmeasurement of each photon via the classical
link. Alice and Bob then discard themeasurements that were done in different bases. The key generated at this
stage is referred to as the sifted key.
Figure 2 shows a portion of the sifted key generated in the experiment. At this stage, the two copies of the key
owned byAlice and Bob are almost identical but they contain some discrepancies. The discrepancies are due to
the imperfections in our system, namely imperfectmode-sorting, detector dark counts, and ambient light.
However, any errors in the keymust be attributed to an eavesdropper and corrected for using the procedure of
error correction. The keys are transformed to a binary formon a symbol-by-symbol basis and randomized by
means of a random-number generator shared byAlice and Bob. The cascade protocol is run byAlice and Bob to
fix the discrepancies by comparing the two keys in a block-by-block fashion and performing parity checks [42].
After error-correction, Alice and Bob share two identical copies of the key.However, a portion of the key can still
be known to Eve from eavesdropping on the quantum channel or from accessing the publicly available
information transmitted in the classical channel during the error correction. Alice and Bob performprivacy
Figure 1. (a) The experimental setup. Alice prepares themodes by carving out pulses from ahighly attenuatedHe-Ne laser using an
AOM.The spatialmode information is impressed on these pulseswith aDMD. Bob’smode sorter and fan-out elementsmap the
OAMmodes and theANGmodes into separated spots that are collected by an array offibers. (b) The alphabet. CCD images of
produced light field profiles in two complementary spatial bases of OAMandANG (d=7). The intensity profile of themodes are
shown on the right. An example of binary holograms used for the generation ofmodes in each basis is shown on the left.
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amplification tominimize Eve’s information. This is done by using a universal hash function formapping the
error-corrected key to a shorter randomkey of desired length [43]. The amount bywhich the key is shortened at
this stage is chosen by estimating the amount of information owned by Eve. Finally, the secure key is used to
securely transmit information (a picture in this case) over the classical channel (see figure 2).
3. Security analysis
Transmission and detection efficiency
The power transmission efficiency of themode sorter’s refractive elements ismeasured to be 85%. TwoHoloeye
PLUTOphase-only SLMs are used for realizing the holograms for the fan-out element and its corresponding
phase-correcting element. In addition, two cylindrical lenses are realized on the SLMs to adjust the aspect ratio
of the transformed beams. The diffraction efficiency of each SLM ismeasured to be approximately45%.
Thefiber array consists of 7multi-mode fibers with 62.5/125 μm core/cladding diameters andNA=0.275.
We havemeasured the efficiency of coupling the transformedmodes to the fiber array to be approximately 18%.
The detection is performedwith Perkin-Elmer SPCM-AQRH-14APDs. The quantum efficiency of the APDs is
η = 0.65. The transmission efficiency of the optical link can be calculated as
Figure 2.Key generation. (a) an example of a random sifted key from the experiment. The spatialmodes aremapped to number
between 0 and 6 (errors aremarked in red and underlined). Each symbol is converted into a three digit binary number first and the
binary key is randomized before the error-correction. Privacy amplificationminimizes Eve’s information by shortening the key
length. (b) Alice encrypts the secretmessage (a picture6) using the shared secure key andBob decrypts it. In this case a short key is
repeatedmany times tomatch the bit length of the image. In practice,multiple uses of a short key cannot provide security and a long
key needs to be used.
6
Old Persian cuneiformwriting from theXerxes tablet (Persia, circa 470 BC). Photo courtesy ofWendyHarns via flickr.
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= × × =T 0.85 (0.45) 0.18 0.031. (3)link 2
Each detector has a typical dark-count rate of −c50 s 1 and an after-pulsing probability of0.3%.
Classical information capacity
Figure 3 shows the conditional probability of Bob detecting eachmode as a function of themode sent by Alice.
Theoretical values for the case of a systemwith no errors is shownon the left for comparison. In order to
measure the SERmore precisely, each rowof thematrix is constructed by sending the same symbolmany times
and detecting all possible outcomes. This scheme eliminates the time consuming procedure of switching among
different spatialmodes and permits amuchmore accuratemeasurement of the error-rate using a large set of sent
and received symbols.
Figure 3.Conditional probability of detection. (a) Theoretical predictions for an ideal system. The bases chosen byAlice and Bob are
marked on the horizontal axis. (b)The experimental results. To construct thematrix a total number of 14million pulses with μ = 0.1
photon per each are sent byAlice. The signals fromAPDs and the gate are collected using a 300 MHz oscilloscope on the fast
acquisitionmode and processed on a computer. (c) 3D view of the experimental data.
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Themutual information between the sent and received symbols is defined as
∑= ( ) ( )( )
I P x y
P x y
P x P y
, log
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( )
. (4)AB
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Here, xi is the event of sending symbol i and yj is the event of detecting symbol j. Assuming a uniformprobability
for sendingNmodes and a uniformprobability of an error occurring in the detection, the equation (4) can be
simplified to [13]
= + + − −
−
I d F F F
F
d
log ( ) log ( ) (1 ) log
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1
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Here, δ ϵ= − −F 1 is the probability of correctly detecting eachmode. The SER caused by imperfect
sorting is denoted by δ and the SER due to the dark counts is shown by ϵ. For the case of our experiment,
δ = 0.065 andϵ = 0.04. The total SER, − F1 , is directlymeasured fromdata as10.5%.We have identified the
error from the imperfect sorting, δ, by repeating the experiment in the high-light level and analyzing the results
after background subtraction. The error probability ϵ can be divided to 2% from stray light,1.9% from
thermally-induced dark counts, and0.15% from after-pulsing.
Using these numbers, we calculate IAB as 2.05 bits per photon. For comparison, the ideal value of IAB for d=7
modes is equal to =dlog ( ) 2.82 bits per photon. Further, the sortingmechanismby itself would result in a value
of 2.29 bits per photon in the absence of any background or dark counts. The probability of correctly detecting
eachmode in the absence of dark counts, also known as the separation efficiency of themode sorter, is calculated
to be slightlymore than 93%.
Note that the calculation ofmutual information only requires the knowledge of the cross-talk and dark
count values. The loss in the optical system reduces the key generation rate of the protocol. However, a uniform
loss in the transmission and detection does not change themutual information betweenAlice and Bob’s sifted
keys since the time frameswith no photon-detection event are removed in the basis reconciliation procedure.
Secure key rate
Weconsider a cloning-based individual attack. In this situation, themutual information between the symbols
owned byAlice and Eve can bewritten as [13]
= + + − −
−( ) ( )I d F F F
F
d
log ( ) log 1 log
1
1
. (6)AE E E
E
2 2 2
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⎞
⎠
Here, FE is thefidelity of Eve’s cloningmachine. The value of Eve’s fidelity can be optimized to gainmaximum
information for any given SER detected by Bob. This quantity is shown to be [13]
= + − − + − −F F
d
d F
d d
d F F
( 1)(1 ) 2
( 1) (1 ) . (7)E
For our experiment, FE=0.43, resulting in =I 0.35AE bits. For a sufficiently long ensemble of symbols owned by
Alice, Bob, and Eve the secure keyR is found to be [2, 44]
= − ( )R R I I Imax , , (8)AB AE BEnet sift ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
whereRsift is the sifted key rate. This rate can bewritten as a function of the pulse repetition rate frep
μ η=R f T1
2
. (9)sift rep link
For our experiment we have μ = 0.1. TheDMDused in our system (Texas InstrumentDLP3000) is capable of
switching between the computer holograms stored in itsmemory at the speed of 4 kHz.We refer to thismode of
operation as burstmode. Burstmode can be used to transmit a short key at =f 4rep kHz. The internalmemory
can only store up to 100 patterns, which limits the applicability of the burstmode for a long key. To generate a
long randomkey, we instead load each hologramonto theDMDusing a computer. This task alongwith the time
needed for synchronizing the two computers reduces the raw key generation rate to approximately =f 1rep Hz.
Using =f 4rep kHz for the burstmode, we calculate =R 4sift (photons s
−1) and =R 6.8net (secure bits s−1).
Note that this calculation characterizes the operation of the optical system in the presence of 14 detectors for
collecting data.
The calculation above can be recast to the alternative form
=R f I . (10)net rep pulse
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Here, Ipulse is the amount of secure information transmitted per each pulse. For our experiment we infer
= × −I 1.7 10pulse 3 secure bits per pulse.
To quantitatively assess the security of our system,we plot the values for the error bound of an intercept-
resend eavesdropping attack, a coherent attack, as well as the SER fromour experimental data infigure 4. In an
intercept-resend attack, the eavesdropper (Eve)measures the state of the intercepted photon in an arbitrarily
selected basis and then resends a photon prepared to be in this same state. In a coherent attack, Eve coherently
probes afinite number of qudits in order to gain information about the key [13]. It is evident from this
graph that our experimental SER is well below the required bounds for security against both intercept-resend
and coherent attacks (figure 4). Unlike intercept-resend attacks, the SER for coherent attacks only depends on
systemdimension d and is independent of the number ofMUBsM [13].Hence, increasing the number ofMUBs
beyond 2 results in a drop in the key ratewithout any gain in security against coherent attacks. Nevertheless,
there is a clear increase in the allowed SER for larger systemdimensions, demonstrating an advantage for using a
high-dimensional encoding scheme forQKD such as that of OAM.
Using the SER, we estimate the information gained by Eve to be 0.35 bits per sifted photon for cloning-based
individual attacks. It has been argued that cloning-based eavesdropping is the optimal strategy for an individual
attack on systems based on qudits [13]. The portion of the key obtained by Eve is removed in the privacy
amplification process, leading to amutual information of 1.7 secure bits per sifted photon in the final key. It
should be emphasized that our secure key rate analysis assumes an infinite key, while any experimental
realization produces only afinite key [45].We areworking toward afinite key analysis of the security, whichwill
be reported in the future.
In contrast to phase-only SLMs that are limited to a frame rate of 60 Hz, theDMDused in our setup has the
ability to rapidly switch betweenmodes at a speed of 4 kHz. This is especially important considering the fact that
the speed of generation of spatialmodes limits the key generation rate of the system.Wemeasure our raw key
generation rate to be 16.4 bits per second (for operation in burstmode). After performing basis reconciliation
and privacy amplification for a sufficiently long key, we estimate the secure key rate to be 6.5 bits per second,
which ismore than 3 orders ofmagnitude larger than that achieved in previous spatial-mode based
protocols [20].
Photonnumber splitting (PNS) attacks
The analysis above considers intercept-resend and cloning based attacks. The PNS attack is yet another
possibility when the protocol uses imperfect single-photon sources. In our protocol, weak coherent pulses
(WCPs) are used for realizing approximate single photon pulses. For small values of photon-number
expectation values, aWCP contains either zero or one photonmost of the times.However, the pulsemay still
containmultiple photonswith a non-zero probability. In this situation, Eve can split one photon off of amulti-
photon signal, without disturbing the polarization or the spatial structure of the signal [46–48]. Eve canmeasure
her photon after basis reconciliation and obtain complete informationwithout causing any error in the signal.
The PNS attacks pose amore serious threat in the presence of loss. In this situation, Eve can, in principle,
replace the lossy channel with a perfect quantum channel and only transmit to Bob the signals of her choice. An
inequality has been developed in [49] that serves as a necessary condition for security
Figure 4.Error-bound for security. Bob’s error bound calculated from theory as a function of the dimension of theHilbert space for
intercept-resend attackswith twoMUBs (M=2) and coherent attacks is plotted alongwith symbol error ratemeasured fromour
experimental data (the error bar shows one standard deviation). It is seen that the symbol error rate fromour experiment lies well
below the theoretical bounds and hence it is sufficient for proof of security.
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>p p . (11)detection multi
Here, pdetection is the total probability of detection events for Bob, and pmulti is the probability of having a pulse
withmulti-photons. For a coherent state with an average photon number o f μ, we have μ = μ μ−P n( , ) e
n !
n
, and
consequently
∑ μ μ= ≈
=
∞
p P n( , )
2
. (12)
n
multi
2
2
The total probability of detection events can be calculated by considering the signal detection events and the
detector dark counts
= + − ≈ +p p p p p p p . (13)detection signal dark signal dark signal dark
Using the parameters for our experiments we have = × −p 5 10multi 3 and
μ η= + ≃ × −p T p 2 10detection link dark 3. It can be see that <p pdetection multi and hence security against PNS
attacks cannot be guaranteed in our current implementation.We discuss the possible approaches for providing
security against PNS attacks in the following section.
Effect of imperfectMUBs
The unbiased relation between the two bases, as defined in equation (2), guarantees that detecting a photon in
thewrong basis results in a completely randomoutcome andhence it reveals zero information about the key. In
practice, however, the imperfect generation and sorting of theOAMandANGmodes results in variations in the
degree of overlap between a pair ofmodes chosen from the two different bases. Such variations can be noticed in
the off-diagonal blocks in thematrix for conditional probability of detection (figure 3). In this situation, the
measurement of a photon in thewrong basis can, in principle, reveal some information about the transmitted
symbol.
Themutual information between the symbols sent in theOAMbasis and detected in the ANGbasis can be
calculated using equation (4). For our experiment, we have calculated =I 0.036OAM ANG bits per photon.
Similarly, themutual information for the case of sending a photon in the ANGbasis and detecting it in theOAM
basis is calculated to be =I 0.058ANG OAM bits per photon.Note that these values aremuch smaller than IAB
which is equal to 2.05 bits per photon.We have assumed an unbiased relation between theOAMandANG
modes in our security analysis.The small number the quantities IANG OAM and IOAM ANG calculated above
justifies the validity of this approximation. Amore complete security analysis needs to take these numbers into
account in estimating the information owned byAlice (IAE). Such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of
current article and should be the subject of future studies.
4. Steps towards practical QKDwithOAMmodes
The secure key rate of aQKD system is considered as the ultimatemetric for quantifying its performance. In the
above sections we described how a high-dimensional encoding scheme such as that of OAMcan potentially
benefit the secure key rate of QKDprotocols.While our experiment provides significant improvements in
realizingOAM-basedQKD, several challenges need to be addressed before such a protocol can be employed for
practical applications. In addition to a high secure key rate, a free-spaceQKD link needs to provide reliable long
distance operation, efficient classical post-processing, ease of alignment, and a rigorous security analysis
considering thefinite size of practical keys.While some of these requirements can be achieved by increasing the
degree of sophistication of the systemor through the use of state-of-the-art technology, there is still need for
theoretical and experimental research before a full demonstration can be performed. Below,we address some of
the current limitations.
Fast key generation
The secure key rate scales proportionally with the raw key generation rate. Although holography techniques can
achieve kHzmode switching rates usingDMDs [39], practical QKDwould require key rates in theGHz regime.
OAMmodes can be generated and switched atMHz rates using on-chip resonators [50] and potentially at GHz
rates usingQ-plates [51].However, to generate the states in the ANGbasis onewould need tomodulate both the
amplitude and phase of the beam, a task that best suits free-space holography. Recently, amethod involving
static holograms realized on an SLMand anAOM for switching between them achieved aMHzmode-switching
rate [52]. Unfortunately, the change in thewavelength caused by the AOM forbids applying thismethod forQKS
since side-channel attacks could be performed based on spectrum.
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Alternatively, generation of OAMandANGmodes at a rate of 1 GHz ormore can be achieved by
illuminating a series of static hologramswith beams frommultiple lasers. The shaped beams after the holograms
can be passively combined using a series of beam splitters. The intensity of each laser beam can then be
modulated either by using electro-opticmodulators or by switching diode lasers on and off [10].
High throughput
The key generation rate drops as loss increases.Moreover, high loss in the communication linkmakes the
protocol vulnerable to PNS attacks. The throughput of our detection system can be readily increased by
employing high efficiency SLMs, or AR-coated custom refractive elements. This would translate to a six-fold
increase in the transmission efficiency in our experiment. Additionally, the amount of loss due to the scattering
in the air can beminimized by operating in the near-infrared regime.
Turbulencemitigation
Atmospheric turbulence results in degradation of the spatial profile of themodes upon propagation. This results
inmixing of the neighboringOAMandANGmodes. The effects of turbulence onOAMmodes has been a topic
of extensive studies [38, 53, 54]. Common solutions formitigating the adverse effects of atmospheric turbulence
include the use of every othermode for encoding [55] and utilization of adaptive optics systems [56]. Recently,
long-haul free-space propagation of OAMmodes has been realized using novel detection schemes [24].
Larger dimensionality
Increasing the number of themodes increases the information carried by each single photon and results in a
higher secure bit rate. Previously, we have shown that ourmode sorter is capable of sorting 25OAMandANG
modeswith an averagemutual information of 4.17 bits per detected photons [41]. Consequently, the encoded
information per photon can be readily increased by increasing the number of APDs in the experiment.
Ultimately, the number ofmodes supported by the optical link is limited by the sizes of the transmitting and
receiving apertures.
Universal security proof
A comprehensive security proof for aQKD system should include both the fundamental and practical properties
of the physical system. The security analysis presented in this work assumes an infinitely long key. For afinite
key, the efficiency of classical post-processing need to bemeasured and used for amore rigorous calculation of
the secure key rate [57]. In addition, our analysis assumes a uniform error-rate and transmission efficiency for all
themodes.While our data demonstrates the rationale for this approximation, amore comprehensive analysis
needs to include the effects of non-uniform SER and loss in amulti-level QKD system.More research is needed
to establish the theoretical framework for security analysis of such systems.
Finally, we have demonstrated security against intercept-resend and cloning-based attacks, while our
implementation remains vulnerable to PNS attacks. This limitation can be avoided by either reducing the loss in
the systemor by employing the decoy-state protocol [58].
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that a functionalQKD systembased on spatial-mode encoding is
realizable with current technology.We report a proof-of-principle experiment that uses a seven-dimensional
alphabet encoded inOAMand in themutual unbiased basis of ANGmodes.We implement a fastmode-
generation technique that uses aDMD to generate spatialmodes at a speed of 4 kHz and amode-transformation
technique that is able tomeasure theOAMandANGcontent of a photonwith an accuracy of 93%.Using these
twomethods, we achieve amutual information of 2.05 bits per sifted photon, which ismore than twice the
maximumallowable capacity of a two-dimensional QKD system. The SER of our scheme ismeasured to be 10.5
%, which is sufficient for proving unconditional security against coherent and individual eavesdropping attacks
for an infinite key. In addition, we lay out a clear path for howour system can be enhanced to performpractical,
high-dimensional QKDusing current technology. For example, our SER can be significantly reduced through
the use of better detectors and amore sophisticatedmode-transformation technique. Our experiment opens the
door to realizing real-world,multi-level quantum communication systemswith record capacities and levels of
security.
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Appendix. Diffraction and radialmodes
It is known thatOAMmodeswith largermode indexℓ have a larger rootmean squared (rms) radius in the far
field [59]. Given the different radial profiles of differentOAMmodes, onemight be concerned that the security
of the protocol is compromised.More specifically, we are interested to knowwhether Eve can gain information
by using the photons that fall outside Bob’s aperture. The details of the diffraction behavior depends on the
radial profile of theOAMmodes as defined in the transmitter’s aperture.We considerOAMmodeswith a top-
hat intensity profile such as the ones used in our experiment. Since diffraction plays no role once the Fresnel
number is sufficiently large, this issue does not directly apply to our experiment. However, the answer to the
question for a low-Fresnel-number system is not trivial. Below, we show that it is impossible for Eve to gain any
information by performing this attack regardless of the Fresnel number of the system.
Intercept and intercept attack
In an intercept and intercept attack (also known as denial of service) Eve detects a photonwithout retransmitting
it. Since Alice andBob disregards the frameswith no photons in basis reconciliation, Evewill not have any
mutual informationwith the sifted key and hence there is no loss of security.
Intercept and resend attack
In this type of attack Eve detects a photon that falls outside of Bob’s apertures in a randombasis. She then resends
a photon in a state determined by the result of hermeasurement into the Bob’s aperture. The geometry for Bob’s
and Eve’s apertures are shown infigure A1. Note that theR R,B E1 andRE2 are all bound between zero and
infinity and sowe are considering themost general case.
We demonstrate anOAMmode’s opticalfield at any plane z byΨℓ z( )OAM . The probability for detecting each
of theOAMmodes by Eve can bewritten as
∫ Ψ=ℓ ℓP z z r r( ) ( ) d . (A.1)
R
R
OAM OAM
2
E
E
1
2
AssumingAlice chooses to sendOAMmodes randomlywith a probability of d1 (where = +d N2 1 is the total
number ofmodes used), the probability for detecting anyOAMmodewill be
∫∑ Ψ=
ℓ
ℓ
=−
P z
d
z r r( )
1
( ) d . (A.2)
N
N
R
R
OAM OAM
2
E
E
1
2
Figure A1.Bob’s and Eve’s receiving apertures.
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Similarly, the probability for detecting each of theANGmodes can bewritten as
∫ Ψ=P z z r r( ) ( ) d , (A.3)n
R
R
n
ANG ANG
2
E
E
1
2
and the probability for detecting anyANGmodewill be
∫∑ Ψ=
=−
P z
d
z r r( )
1
( ) d . (A.4)
n N
N
R
R
n
ANG ANG
2
E
E
1
2
Wecan simplify equation (A.4) using the definition of the ANGmodes
∑Ψ Ψ π ℓ=
ℓ
ℓ
=−d
n
d
1
exp
i2
. (A.5)n
N
N
ANG OAM ⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
Substituting Ψ nANGwe get
∫
∫
∫
∫
∫
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
Ψ π ℓ
Ψ Ψ π ℓ ℓ
Ψ Ψ π ℓ ℓ
Ψ Ψ δ
Ψ
=
= − ′
= − ′
=
=
=
ℓ
ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ
ℓ
=− =−
=− =− ′=−
′
=− ′=−
′
=−
=− ′=−
′
′
=−
P z
d d
n
d
r r
d d
n
d
r r
d d
n
d
r r
d
r r
d
r r
P z
( )
1 1
exp
i2
d
1 1
exp
i2 ( )
d
1 1
exp
i2 ( )
d
1
d
1
d
( ). (A.6)
n N
N
R
R
N
N
R
R
n N
N
N
N
N
N
R
R
N
N
N
N
n N
N
R
R
N
N
N
N
R
R
N
N
ANG OAM
2
OAM OAM
*
OAM OAM
*
OAM OAM
* ,
OAM
2
OAM
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
The above result shows that it is equally probable for Eve to detect a photon from either theOAMbasis or the
ANGbasis using the beam from any range of radii. Consequently, it is impossible for Eve to gain information by
detecting a photon fromoutside of Bob’s aperture.Moreover, the result remains valid at any plane z fromnear
field to farfield.
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